We show the existence of stationary limiting average "-equilibria (" > 0)
Introduction
Recursive repeated games with absorbing states are a special kind of stochastic games with nite state and action spaces, and with IN := f1; 2; : : :g as the set of stages. A two-person stochastic game can be described by a state space S := f1; : : :; zg; and a corresponding collection fM 1 ; : : :; M z g of bimatrices, where entry (i; j) of M s consists of r 1 (s; i; j); r 2 (s; i; j) 2 IR and a probability vector ? p(1js; i; j); : : :; p(zjs; i; j) . The stochastic game is to be played in the following way. At each stage n 2 IN the play is in precisely one of the states. If the play is in state s at stage n then, simultaneously and independently, both players are to choose an action: player 1 chooses a row i of M s ; while player 2 chooses a column j of M s : These choices induce an immediate payo r 1 (s; i; j) to player 1 and r 2 (s; i; j) to player 2. Next, the play moves with probability p(tjs; i; j) to state t, where new actions are to be chosen at stage n + 1:
The players are assumed to have complete information and perfect recall.
A player's strategy is a speci cation of a probability distribution, at each stage and state, over the available actions, conditional on the history of the play up to that stage. Strategies are generally denoted by for player 1 and for player 2. A strategy is called stationary if, for each state, it speci es a mixed action to be used whenever this state is being visited. Stationary strategies are denoted by x and y. A stationary strategy is called pure, if for each state, it speci es one action to be chosen. A pair of strategies ( ; ) with an initial state s 2 S determines a stochastic process on the payo s. The sequences of payo s are evaluated by the limiting average reward, given for player k 2 f1; 2g by k (s; ; ) = E s lim inf
where R k n are random variables for the payo s of player k at stage n 2 IN:
A pair of strategies ( ; ) is a limiting average "-equilibrium (" 0), if neither player can gain more than " by unilateral deviation, i. Although repeated games with absorbing states always have limiting average "-equilibria (cf. Vrieze & Thuijsman 1989 ]), it is well-known that they need not have stationary ones (cf. Sorin 1986] ). Recently, Evangelista et al. 1994] showed the existence of stationary limiting average "-equilibria for ARAT re- In section 2 we give the formal de nitions and notations and we derive some preliminary results. For recursive repeated games with absorbing states we introduce proper strategy pairs and show their existence. In section 3 of this paper we show the existence of stationary limiting average "-equilibria.
Several examples are provided to give the intuition behind the steps of the proof. Section 4 concludes with some examples showing that neither n-person recursive repeated games with absorbing states with n > 2, nor two-person recursive games, necessarily has stationary limiting average "-equilibria.
Preliminaries
We rst introduce some necessary notations. We use the notation ? for a twoperson recursive repeated game with absorbing states. Without loss of generality we suppose the absorbing states of ? to be of size 1 1 and the non-absorbing state to be of size m n: Thus there is only one non-trivial state with action spaces I =: f1; : : :; mg and J := f1; : : :; ng. Therefore the stationary strategy spaces X and Y have the form:
The initial state is the non-absorbing one, and the associated bimatrix will be denoted by M. If entry (i; j) of M is chosen, then with probability p ij a transition occurs to an absorbing state where the payo is a k ij to player k, and with probability 1 ? p ij the play stays in the initial state. In the initial state all immediate payo s are equal to 0. For completeness we de ne a k ij := 0 if p ij = 0.
De nition 2.1 Let x and y be arbitrary stationary strategies. We introduce p xy := we say that (x; y) is recurrent; otherwise we say (x; y) is absorbing. Now T 
Basic assumptions
Each time that we write about a limit for to 0, we have a discrete sequence in mind, which can be assumed to converge by compactness arguments and by niteness of the state and action spaces. Similarly, whenever we consider strategies depending on 2 (0; 1), we implicitly assume that the carriers of these strategies are independent of and is close to 0. Also, we identify each pure stationary strategy with the corresponding action. Because every xed point is a -proper pair, the proof is complete. 2
3 Stationary "-Equilibria
In this section we shall prove our main result:
Theorem 3.1
In every recursive repeated game with absorbing states ?, there exists a stationary "-equilibrium (x " ; y " ) for all " > 0.
In order to prove this theorem we rst give a su cient condition for a strategy x to be an "-best reply against some y .
Lemma 3.2
For all 2 (0; 1), let x and y be arbitrary stationary strategies in the game ?
and x (e) p ey 1 (e; y ) P e2B 1 (y ) x (e) p ey + P e6 2B 1 (y ) x (e) p ey = P e2B 1 (y ) x (e) x (i ) p ey 1 (e; y ) + P e6 2B 1 (y )
x (e) x (i ) p ey 1 (e; y ) P e2B 1 (y ) x (e) x (i ) p ey + P e6 2B 1 (y )
x (e) x (i ) p ey P e2B 1 (y ) x (e) x (i ) p ey 1 (e; y ) P e2B 1 (y ) x (e) x (i ) p ey ? " = 1 (i ; y ) ? ": 2
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Let (e x; e y) be a proper pair, where (e x; e y) = lim #0 (x ; y ) for some sequence of -proper pairs. We show the following (illustrated in Example 2 below):
(1) If (e x; e y) is absorbing, then (x ; y ) is an "-equilibrium for small :
(2) If (e x; e y) is recurrent, then either (e x; e y) or (x ; e y) or (e x; y ) is an "-equilibrium for small .
Part (1) 2 )) is also -proper for small 2 (0; 1), so (e x; e y) = ((1; 0; 0); (1; 0)) is proper. Here (e x; e y) is recurrent, and the second action of player 1 is a pro table best reply against e y and leads to absorption in entry (2,1). Observe that for small , the pair (x ; e y) leads to absorption in in the same entry with probability close to 1, so x is an "-best reply against e y. On the other hand, e y is obviously a best reply against x , so (x ; e y) is an "-equilibrium for small .
Examples and Remarks
The examples below illustrate that the main theorem cannot be strengthened.
The non-existence of stationary 0-equilibria in recursive repeated games with absorbing states is well-known (cf. Example 1 or Everett 1957] ) just as the non-existence of stationary "-equilibria for repeated games with absorbing states (cf. Our last example is a recursive game which has no stationary "-equilibrium. Remark 3
Observe that the "-equilibria constructed are also "-equilibria in the nitely repeated game, if the number of repetitions is large enough.
